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**STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
SECURITIES DIVISION**

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IN THE MATTER OF DETERMINING whether there has been a violation of the Securities Act of Washington by Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. securities salespersons:

Gordon E. Adams; Suzanne T. Adams; Elizabeth Adams Armstrong; Ross E. Bruner; Steve F. Haug; Gary T. Hundebly; Lori L. Masterson; Ronald H. Mayfield; Michael H. McMillen; Theodore R. Metoyer; Lamar J. Miller; Annette O. Miller; Randal M. Saccomanno; Ronald J. Saccomanno; and Ryan S. Saccomanno,

Respondents.

Order Number S-04-041-04-SC01

STATEMENT OF CHARGES AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENTER AN ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST, REVOKE OR SUSPEND REGISTRATIONS, CENSURE, IMPOSE FINES, AND CHARGE COSTS

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON TO:

Gordon E. Adams, CRD # 1217255
Suzanne T. Adams, CRD # 1098129
Elizabeth Adams Armstrong, CRD # 2680556
Ross E. Bruner, CRD # 1208249
Steve F. Haug, CRD # 2624111
Gary T. Hundebly, CRD # 1305730
Lori L. Masterson, CRD # 2201909
Ronald H. Mayfield, CRD # 1315009
Michael H. McMillen, CRD # 2892013
Theodore R. Metoyer, CRD # 1324693
Lamar J. Miller, CRD # 1208293
Annette O. Miller, CRD # 1356859
Randal M. Saccomanno, CRD # 2507199
Ronald J. Saccomanno, CRD # 3030965
Ryan S. Saccomanno, CRD # 1997909

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STATEMENT OF CHARGES

Please take notice that the Securities Administrator of the State of Washington has reason to believe that the Respondents, Gordon E. Adams, Suzanne T. Adams, Elizabeth Adams Armstrong, Ross

STATEMENT OF CHARGES AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENTER AN ORDER TO REVOKE OR SUSPEND REGISTRATION, CENSURE, IMPOSE FINES, AND CHARGE COSTS

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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Securities Division
PO Box 9033
Olympia, WA 98507-9033
360-902-8760

1 E. Bruner, Steve F. Haug, Gary T. Hundebly, Lori L. Masterson, Ronald H. Mayfield, Michael H.
2 McMillen, Theodore R. Metoyer, Lamar J. Miller, Annette O. Miller, Randal M. Saccomanno, Ronald J.
3 Saccomanno, and Ryan S. Saccomanno, have each violated the Securities Act of Washington. The
4 Securities Administrator further believes those violations justify the revocation or suspension of the
5 securities salesperson registrations and/or investment adviser representative registrations of Gordon E.
6 Adams, Suzanne T. Adams, Ross E. Bruner, Steve F. Haug, Ronald H. Mayfield, Theodore R. Metoyer,
7 Randal M. Saccomanno, Ronald J. Saccomanno, and Ryan S. Saccomanno, pursuant to RCW
8 21.20.110(1), as well as the entry of an order against each of those Respondents to cease and desist from
9 such violations pursuant to RCW 21.20.390, imposing fines pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(1) and RCW
10 21.20.395, and charging costs pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(7) and RCW 21.20.390(5). The Securities
11 Administrator further believes these violations justify the censure of Elizabeth Adams Armstrong, Gary
12 T. Hundebly, Lori L. Masterson, Michael H. McMillen, Lamar J. Miller, and Annette O. Miller, as well as
13 the entry of an order against those Respondents imposing fines pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(1). The
14 Securities Administrator finds as follows:

15 **TENTATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT**

16 ***INTRODUCTION***

17 1. Respondents made unsuitable recommendations to investors of Metropolitan Mortgage and
18 Securities Co., Inc. (“Metropolitan”) and Summit Securities, Inc. (“Summit”) securities. Many of the
19 Respondents also misled investors about the risks of these securities. These securities included
20 Metropolitan debentures, Summit investment certificates, Metropolitan and Summit preferred stock, and
21 Metropolitan and Summit notes (collectively “the proprietary products”). As the financial condition of
22 Metropolitan and Summit deteriorated, the risk of the proprietary products increased. Despite these

1 increasing risks, from January 2001 through December 2003, Respondents sold proprietary products
2 totaling over \$162 million to investors. Many of these investors were elderly, financially
3 unsophisticated, and had limited assets that were highly concentrated in the proprietary products. With
4 Metropolitan and Summit's bankruptcy filings in 2004, thousands of investors in the Pacific Northwest
5 are facing the loss of their life savings.

6 ***RESPONDENTS***

7 2. Gordon E. Adams was registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
8 securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from June 1984 to December 2003.
9 He currently resides in Walla Walla, Washington.

10 3. Suzanne T. Adams was registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
11 securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from October 1983 to December 2003.
12 She currently resides in Walla Walla, Washington.

13 4. Elizabeth Adams Armstrong has been registered with the Washington State Securities
14 Division as a securities salesperson for Pacific West Securities since December 2003. She was registered
15 as a securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from November 1996 to
16 December 2003. She currently resides in Beaverton, Oregon.

17 5. Ross E. Bruner has been registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
18 securities salesperson for APS Financial Corporation since August 1988. He was registered as a
19 securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from June 1982 to December 2003.
20 He currently resides in Woodinville, Washington.

21 6. Steve F. Haug has been registered with the Washington State Securities Division as an
22 investment adviser representative for IMS Capital Management since December 2003. He was registered

1 as an investment adviser representative with Metropolitan Financial Services, Inc. from November 1999
2 to December 2003. He was registered as a securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities,
3 Inc. from July 1996 to December 2003, and for Morgan Stanley DW Inc. from May 1995 to March 1996.
4 He currently resides in Vancouver, Washington.

5 7. Gary T. Hundebly was registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
6 securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from September 1984 to December
7 2003. He currently resides in University Place, Washington.

8 8. Lori L. Masterson has been registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
9 securities salesperson for Kovack Securities, Inc. since December 2003. She was registered as a
10 securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from December 1992 to December
11 2003. She currently resides in Greenacres, Washington.

12 9. Ronald H. Mayfield was registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
13 securities salesperson for Mutual Securities, Inc. from December 2003 to May 2004. He was registered
14 as a securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from October 1984 to December
15 2003. He currently resides in Spokane, Washington.

16 10. Michael H. McMillen has been registered with the Washington State Securities Division as
17 a securities salesperson for Mutual Securities, Inc. since December 2003. He was registered as a
18 securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from May 1997 to December 2003.
19 He currently resides in White Salmon, Washington.

20 11. Theodore R. Metoyer was registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
21 securities salesperson for Mutual Securities, Inc. from December 2003 to March 2004. He was registered
22

1 as a securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from November 1984 to
2 December 2003. He currently resides in Spokane, Washington.

3 12. Lamar J. Miller has been registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
4 securities salesperson for Kovack Securities, Inc. since March 2004. He was registered as a securities
5 salesperson for Crown Capital Securities, L.P. from November 2003 to March 2004, for Metropolitan
6 Investment Securities, Inc. from October 1983 to July 1996, as well as February 2000 to November 2003,
7 and for SunAmerica Securities, Inc. from July 1996 to February 2000. He currently resides in Veradale,
8 Washington.

9 13. Annette O. Miller has been registered with the Washington State Securities Division as a
10 securities salesperson for Kovack Securities, Inc. since March 2004. She was registered as a securities
11 salesperson for Crown Capital Securities, L.P. from January 2004 to March 2004, for Metropolitan
12 Investment Securities, Inc. from March 1985 to September 1998, as well as February 2000 to December
13 2003, and for SunAmerica Securities, Inc. from September 1998 to February 2000. She currently resides
14 in Veradale, Washington.

15 14. Randal M. Saccomanno has been registered with the Washington State Securities Division
16 as a securities salesperson for Pacific West Securities since December 2003. He was registered as a
17 securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from June 1994 to December 2003.
18 He currently resides in Deer Park, Washington.

19 15. Ronald J. Saccomanno has been registered with the Washington State Securities Division as
20 a securities salesperson for Pacific West Securities since December 2003. He was registered as a
21 securities salesperson for Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. from February 1998 to December
22 2003. He currently resides in Spokane, Washington.

1 property development. Summit filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
2 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington on February 4, 2004. At
3 the time of the bankruptcy filing, over 3,600 investors owned approximately \$113.6 million in
4 investment certificates (including accrued interest) and several thousand investors owned preferred stock
5 worth approximately \$29 million.

6 19. Western United Life Assurance Company (“WULA”) was incorporated in the state of
7 Washington in 1963 and is Metropolitan’s largest subsidiary. WULA’s primary business activity is
8 investing in receivables and other investments. WULA is principally funded by annuity contract sales
9 and premiums from the sale of life insurance policies. The Office of the Insurance Commissioner
10 (“OIC”) was appointed the Statutory Receiver for WULA in Thurston County Superior Court by order of
11 Judge Paula Casey on March 2, 2004. WULA is now operating under OIC’s administrative supervision.

12 20. Metropolitan Investment Securities, Inc. (“MIS”) was incorporated in the state of
13 Washington in 1979. MIS became a wholly owned subsidiary of Summit in January 1995 when Summit
14 acquired MIS from Metropolitan. Sandifur was the President of MIS. MIS was registered in the state of
15 Washington as a broker-dealer from March 1979 until December 2003. MIS was the exclusive selling
16 agent for the public securities offerings of Metropolitan and Summit. On October 20, 2003, the NASD
17 entered into a settlement with MIS of its investigation of MIS’s securities sales practices. The NASD
18 alleged that MIS registered representatives engaged in fraudulent, deceptive and unethical practices in
19 the sale of the Metropolitan and Summit securities, including making misleading, unfair and unbalanced
20 sales presentations to investors and making unsuitable recommendations to investors. Pursuant to
21 settlement, the NASD censured MIS, fined it \$500,000, and ordered MIS to pay restitution of \$2,882,010

1 to certain investors. MIS filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the
2 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Washington on February 4, 2004.

3 ***NATURE OF THE CONDUCT***

4 **Risks of the Proprietary Products**

5 21. The Metropolitan debentures, Summit investment certificates, Metropolitan and Summit
6 preferred stock, and Metropolitan and Summit notes (collectively “the proprietary products”), as
7 unsecured investments, involved the significant risk that investors could lose some or all of their
8 principal. The debentures, investment certificates, and notes were debt securities backed only by the
9 credit of Metropolitan and Summit and were not secured by a lien on any specific property. They were
10 not insured by the FDIC or any governmental agency. In addition, they were not liquid investments due
11 to the absence of an established trading market. Metropolitan and Summit preferred stock involved
12 greater risk than the debentures, investment certificates, and notes. The preferred stock offered an
13 apparent ownership interest in the company that paid dividends at specified rates that were set on a
14 periodic basis. The preferred stock was subordinate to each corporation’s debt, including the debentures,
15 investment certificates, and notes. There was no active trading market for the preferred stock at the time
16 it was issued, nor did one develop. Despite these significant risks, Respondents offered and sold the
17 proprietary products as virtually risk-free.

18 22. Starting in at least 2000, the risk that Metropolitan and Summit investors could lose their
19 principal increased as the financial condition of the companies deteriorated. As disclosed in prospectuses
20 and annual reports in the years leading up to the bankruptcies, both companies incurred losses, had
21 insufficient earnings to cover their fixed charges, and were dependent on new offerings to pay existing
22 investors. For the first time in its history, Metropolitan incurred net losses for the fiscal years ended

1 September 30, 2000 and 2001 of \$7.6 million and \$8.9 million, respectively. In 2002, Metropolitan
2 reported a profit of \$3.9 million before payment of preferred stock dividends. After dividend payments,
3 Metropolitan reported a loss of \$861,900. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2003, Metropolitan reported
4 a loss of \$2.6 million. For Metropolitan, earnings were insufficient to meet fixed charges and preferred
5 stock dividends by approximately \$0.8 million, \$17.4 million, \$40.2 million and \$3.4 million for the
6 years ended September 30, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively. Also for the first time in its history,
7 Summit incurred a net loss of approximately \$2.5 million for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2001.
8 For Summit, earnings were insufficient to meet fixed charges and preferred stock dividends by
9 approximately \$7.6 million for the year ended September 30, 2001. As disclosed in the annual reports
10 for Metropolitan and Summit in 2000, 2001 and 2002, the companies were, at least in part, dependent on
11 new investments to pay principal and interest to existing investors. Despite the risks associated with the
12 companies' financial losses, earnings shortfalls, and reliance on new investments, Respondents continued
13 to offer and sell the proprietary products as virtually risk-free.

14 23. The risk that investors could lose their principal was exacerbated by preemption of the
15 Washington State Securities Division from regulation of Metropolitan's securities offerings. By virtue of
16 the listing of the Metropolitan notes on the Pacific Stock Exchange in January 2000, the Securities
17 Division was preempted from enforcing its substantive registration requirements with regard to
18 Metropolitan's debentures. In January 2002, the Metropolitan Preferred Stock Series E-7 was approved
19 for listing on the American Stock Exchange. As with the debentures, the Securities Division was
20 preempted from regulating the sale of Metropolitan preferred stock. Prior to preemption, Washington
21 had restrained the growth of Metropolitan's outstanding debentures and preferred stock, which helped
22 ensure the safety and soundness of the company. After preemption, there was a proliferation of

1 debenture sales. In fact, as disclosed in prospectuses and annual reports, Metropolitan increased its
2 outstanding debentures from approximately \$199 million as of September 30, 1999 to well over \$300
3 million by the end of 2002. This caused an enormous financial strain on the company due to the increase
4 in interest and principal payments associated with these securities. Despite the risk of the increasingly
5 leveraged financial position of the companies, Respondents continued to offer and sell the proprietary
6 products as virtually risk-free.

7 24. In addition to issuing more debt, Metropolitan made a significant change in business
8 strategy in 2001 that further increased the risk of loss of principal for investors in the proprietary
9 products. During the 1990s, Metropolitan had invested in the origination and securitization of residential
10 mortgage loans. Beginning in 2001, Metropolitan began to focus on the origination of commercial real
11 estate loans and commercial property development. These loans were made to borrowers unable to
12 obtain conventional financing. As disclosed in the prospectuses for Metropolitan debentures and
13 preferred stock, the shift away from the company's traditional business resulted in an earnings risk and
14 potential lack of liquidity for the company. Despite the risk of shifting to a new and unproven business
15 model, Respondents continued to offer and sell the proprietary products as virtually risk-free.

16 **Sales Practices of MIS Representatives**

17 25. While MIS marketed itself as a full-service brokerage firm selling mutual funds and general
18 securities, the vast majority of MIS revenues were derived from the sale of the proprietary products. The
19 proprietary products were sold exclusively by MIS securities salespersons (the "MIS representatives").
20 Pursuant to Washington law, NASD rules, and MIS policies and procedures, MIS representatives were
21 required to assure that all sales of the proprietary products were suitable given an investor's financial
22 situation and needs, investment objectives, and risk tolerance. In addition, MIS representatives were

1 required to make suitable recommendations of investments that were not unduly concentrated in one
2 company or product in order to avoid the risks of an undiversified investment portfolio. Further, MIS
3 representatives were required by MIS to certify the suitability of each recommendation through the use of
4 a document called a subscription agreement, which recorded an investor's risk tolerance, investment
5 objectives, and net worth. Despite their suitability obligations, Respondents made unsuitable
6 recommendations that resulted in the over concentration of the limited assets of investors in the
7 proprietary products.

8 26. Starting in the 1990s, MIS provided its registered representatives with guidelines
9 prohibiting sales of the proprietary products in certain circumstances (the "MIS guidelines"). Under the
10 MIS guidelines, an investor could invest no more than: (1) 20% of his or her total net worth¹ in
11 Metropolitan and Summit preferred stock, (2) 30% of his or her total net worth in either Metropolitan or
12 Summit, and (3) 40% of his or her total net worth in Metropolitan and Summit combined. The MIS
13 guidelines prohibited investments in the proprietary products beyond these percentages. As illustrated
14 below, Respondents frequently overstated the net worth of investors thereby inappropriately securing
15 approval for transactions that would have otherwise been prohibited under the MIS guidelines.

16 Sales of the Proprietary Products by the Respondents

17 Gordon E. & Suzanne T. Adams

18 *Background*

19 27. Gordon E. Adams ("Gordon") associated with MIS in October 1983 and his wife, Suzanne
20 T. Adams ("Suzanne"), associated with MIS in February 1983 (collectively "the Adamses"). Prior to
21

22 ¹ Under MIS procedures, net worth did not include primary residence, furnishings, or primary automobile.

1 their association MIS, the Adamses had no experience selling securities. Gordon's prior work experience
2 consisted of serving in the armed forces as an aircraft pilot and selling tractors for his family's tractor
3 company. Suzanne's prior work experience consisted of working as a part-time sewing instructor.

4 28. While associated with MIS, the Adamses did business from their home in Walla Walla,
5 Washington.

6 29. Upon joining MIS as independent contractors, the Adamses offered only Metropolitan
7 debentures. After MIS became a full-service brokerage in the mid-1990s, the Adamses continued to sell
8 primarily the proprietary products. As of August 2002, proprietary products accounted for at least three-
9 quarters of their total income.

10 30. From January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003 (hereinafter the "relevant time period"),
11 the Adamses made approximately 1,634 sales of the proprietary products. These sales totaled
12 approximately \$18,377,000. According to the Adamses, 30% of their sales during the relevant time
13 period were made to investors who had 20% or more of their net worth concentrated in the proprietary
14 products.

15 *Unsuitable Investment Recommendations and Falsifying of Account Information*

16 31. The Adamses made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to many
17 investors. These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and
18 had a limited knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other
19 assets, and who were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their
20 retirement years, as illustrated by the three examples below.

21 32. In 2001 and 2002, the Adamses sold seven Metropolitan debentures totaling approximately
22 \$94,000 to a couple in their early 60s. Including these investments, this couple had approximately

1 \$185,000 invested in the proprietary products. Their investment objective was to save for retirement and
2 they believed they were being placed in an investment with almost no risk. The Adamses overstated the
3 net worth of the couple on the subscription agreements by including the present value of the husband's
4 future retirement benefits, falsely representing that the investments met the MIS guidelines. At the time
5 of the investments, their net worth included the proceeds from the sale of their home, which were soon
6 used to purchase another home. Excluding these sale proceeds, their Metropolitan investments
7 represented approximately 65% of their net worth.

8 33. From 2000 through 2002, the Adamses sold six Metropolitan debentures with five year
9 terms totaling \$85,000 to a couple in their late 80s. The couple wanted a low risk, secure investment. In
10 December 2000, the husband was living in a nursing home due to his deteriorating health. By April
11 2001, he returned home, but was bed-ridden. The couple intended for the Metropolitan investments to
12 support his health care costs, due to the fact that they did not have long-term care insurance. Their
13 Metropolitan investments represented almost 20% of their net worth. Their net worth was composed
14 primarily of illiquid investments and the purchase of the Metropolitan debentures increased this lack of
15 liquidity.

16 34. From April 2001 through August 2002, the Adamses sold five investments in the
17 proprietary products totaling approximately \$187,700 to a couple in their late 60s. These customers were
18 seeking a low risk investment that offered safety of their principal. The funds for their investments came
19 from retirement accounts. The Adamses overstated the net worth of the couple on the subscription
20 agreement. In August 2001, when the couple decided to invest additional funds with Metropolitan, the
21 Adamses recalculated the couple's estimated net worth from \$197,000 to \$531,000. The additional
22 \$330,000 was derived in part from including the present value of the husband's retirement pension. This

1 calculation assumed the husband would live for another 23 years, until age 90. In actuality, the couple's
2 Metropolitan and Summit investments represented approximately 70% of their net worth.

3 *Fraudulent Presentations*

4 35. The Adamses made statements to investors regarding the proprietary products that were
5 inconsistent with the risks of the investments, including the risk that investors could lose some or all of
6 their principal (see above, "Risks of the Proprietary Products"). The Adamses emphasized only the
7 safety and soundness of the investments during their presentations to investors. These presentations
8 focused on apparently positive attributes of the proprietary products, including one or more of the
9 following: Metropolitan and Summit having never missed a payment to investors; the length of time
10 Metropolitan had been in business and the company's reputation in the Spokane community; the large
11 asset base of Metropolitan, Summit and their subsidiaries; the companies' extensive real estate holdings;
12 the high interest rates of the proprietary products; and that their family was personally invested in the
13 proprietary products. By virtue of these presentations, investments that had significant risk were offered
14 and sold by the Adamses as virtually risk-free.

15 Ross E. Bruner

16 *Background*

17 36. Ross E. Bruner ("Bruner") associated with MIS in June 1982. Prior to his association with
18 MIS, Bruner had no experience selling securities. Bruner's prior work experience included being a real
19 estate agent and working in sales for a construction equipment company.

20 37. While associated with MIS, Bruner did business from an office in Redmond, Washington.

21 38. From January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003, Bruner made approximately 2,049 sales
22 of the proprietary products. These sales totaled approximately \$25,708,354. According to Bruner, 35%

1 of his sales during the relevant time period were made to investors who had 20% or more of their net
2 worth concentrated in the proprietary products.

3 *Unsuitable Investment Recommendations and Falsifying of Account Information*

4 39. Bruner made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to many investors.
5 These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and had a limited
6 knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other assets, and who
7 were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their retirement
8 years, as illustrated by the three examples below.

9 40. In January 2003, Bruner sold a \$10,000 debenture to a retired couple in their 70s. At the
10 time of this investment, they had approximately \$31,000 invested in Metropolitan debentures and
11 \$16,000 in Metropolitan preferred stock. The couple wanted a safe investment that supplemented their
12 income. Bruner overstated the net worth of the couple on the subscription agreements. At the time of
13 this investment, virtually their entire net worth, excluding their residence, was invested in the proprietary
14 products.

15 41. In April 2003, Bruner sold three debentures totaling approximately \$28,000 to a 69 year-old
16 widow. Including these investments, she had approximately \$85,000 invested in the proprietary
17 products. Her investment objective was to save for retirement. At the time of this investment,
18 approximately 40% of her net worth was invested in the proprietary products. Due to the Metropolitan
19 and Summit bankruptcy, she was forced to defer her retirement because of the loss of income from her
20 investments.

21 42. In April 2003, Bruner sold a \$30,000 debenture with a five year term to a retired couple in
22 their late 70s. The wife suffered from various health problems, including cancer, partial blindness, and

1 dementia. The couple wanted a secure investment. The couple had purchased WULA fixed annuities in
2 the past and believed they were investing in another annuity. Bruner overstated the net worth of the
3 couple on the subscription agreement by more than doubling their stated net worth, falsely representing
4 that the investments met the MIS guidelines. The debenture comprised approximately one-quarter of
5 their actual net worth, excluding their primary residence. Their net worth was composed almost entirely
6 of illiquid investments and the purchase of the Metropolitan debenture increased this lack of liquidity.

7 *Fraudulent Presentations*

8 43. Bruner made statements to investors regarding the proprietary products that were
9 inconsistent with the risks of the investments, including the risk that investors could lose some or all of
10 their principal (see above, "Risks of the Proprietary Products"). Bruner emphasized only the safety and
11 soundness of the investments during his presentations to investors. These presentations focused on
12 apparently positive attributes of the proprietary products, including one or more of the following:
13 Metropolitan and Summit having never missed a payment to investors; the length of time Metropolitan
14 had been in business and the company's reputation in the Spokane community; the large asset base of
15 Metropolitan, Summit and their subsidiaries; the companies' extensive real estate holdings; the high
16 interest rates of the proprietary products; and that he was personally invested in the proprietary products.
17 By virtue of these presentations, investments that had significant risk were offered and sold by Bruner as
18 virtually risk-free.

1 Steve F. Haug

2 *Background*

3 44. Steve F. Haug (“Haug”) became employed with MIS in their operations department in April
4 1996. In August 1998, Haug became a securities salesperson for MIS. With the exception of ten months
5 spent as a broker at Dean Witter and college employment, Haug had virtually no prior work experience.

6 45. When Haug began to sell securities for MIS, he purchased a book of business from two
7 Vancouver, Washington representatives who were retiring. This book of business included MIS clients
8 who were located mostly in the Vancouver area. During the relevant time period, Haug did business
9 from his home in Vancouver.

10 46. Haug sold the proprietary products almost exclusively. As of January 2003, proprietary
11 product sales accounted for 100% of his total MIS income. Haug also held an insurance license and the
12 only other source of income was selling a small number of fixed annuities through WULA.

13 47. From January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003, Haug made approximately 1,466 sales
14 of the proprietary products. These sales totaled approximately \$20,205,201. According to Haug, 40% of
15 his sales during the relevant time period were made to investors who had 20% or more of their net worth
16 concentrated in the proprietary products.

17 *Unsuitable Investment Recommendations and Falsifying of Account Information*

18 48. Haug made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to many investors.
19 These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and had a limited
20 knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other assets, and who
21 were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their retirement
22 years, as illustrated by the three examples below.

1 49. In April and May 2001, Haug sold two Summit investment certificates totaling
2 approximately \$50,000 to a man in his late 50s with a low risk tolerance. The investor's investment
3 objective was to save for his upcoming retirement. He had previously been invested in mutual funds and
4 was seeking a safer, less volatile investment. Haug overstated the investor's net worth on the
5 subscription agreements by almost \$80,000. At the time of this investment, almost one-third of the
6 investor's net worth was invested in Summit investment certificates.

7 50. In May 2002, Haug sold a \$15,000 Metropolitan debenture to a retired couple in their late
8 70s. Including this investment, the couple had approximately \$165,000 invested in the proprietary
9 products. They were seeking a safe investment that would supplement their Social Security payments.
10 Haug overstated the net worth of the couple on the subscription agreements by almost \$450,000, falsely
11 representing that the investments met the MIS guidelines. At the time of this investment, almost their
12 entire net worth, excluding their residence, was invested in the proprietary products. When they stopped
13 receiving interest payments on their investments due to the bankruptcy of Metropolitan, the couple was
14 forced to take a reverse mortgage on their residence to generate monthly income.

15 51. In January 2001, Haug sold five Metropolitan debentures totaling \$25,000 to a 77 year-old
16 widow. Her investment objective was preservation of capital. She had limited investment experience
17 and her only other investments were a small savings account and a savings bond. The maturity dates on
18 the debentures varied from one to five years and her plan was to rely on the maturing debentures to
19 supplement her modest savings. At the time of these investments, she had a net worth of approximately
20 \$65,000. Her Metropolitan debentures comprised almost 40% of her assets.

1 *Fraudulent Presentations*

2 52. Haug made statements to investors regarding the proprietary products that were inconsistent
3 with the risks of the investments, including the risk that investors could lose some or all of their principal
4 (see above, "Risks of the Proprietary Products"). Haug emphasized only the safety and soundness of the
5 investments during his presentations to investors. These presentations focused on apparently positive
6 attributes of the proprietary products, including one or more of the following: Metropolitan and Summit
7 having never missed a payment to investors; the length of time Metropolitan had been in business and the
8 company's reputation in the Spokane community; the large asset base of Metropolitan, Summit and their
9 subsidiaries; the companies' extensive real estate holdings; the high interest rates of the proprietary
10 products; and that he was personally invested in the proprietary products. By virtue of these
11 presentations, investments that had significant risk were offered and sold by Haug as virtually risk-free.

12 Ronald H. Mayfield

13 *Background*

14 53. Ronald H. Mayfield ("Mayfield") associated with MIS in October 1984. Prior to his
15 association with MIS, Mayfield had no experience selling securities. Mayfield's prior work experience
16 was as a business representative for a labor union and as a mechanic.

17 54. Mayfield did business from Metropolitan's headquarters in Spokane, Washington.

18 55. Upon joining MIS as an independent contractor, Mayfield offered only Metropolitan
19 debentures. After MIS became a full-service brokerage in the mid-1990s, Mayfield continued to sell
20 primarily the proprietary products.

1 56. According to Mayfield, from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003, he made
2 approximately 218 sales of the proprietary products totaling close to \$4,000,000 to investors who had
3 over 20% of their net worth concentrated in the proprietary products.

4 *Unsuitable Investment Recommendations and Falsifying of Account Information*

5 57. Mayfield made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to many investors.
6 These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and had a limited
7 knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other assets, and who
8 were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their retirement
9 years, as illustrated by the three examples below.

10 58. In January 2002, Mayfield sold a Metropolitan debenture worth over \$15,000 to a retired
11 couple who were 70 and 64 years of age. Including this investment, the couple had approximately
12 \$180,000 invested in the proprietary products. The couple's primary investment objective was
13 preservation of capital and they were relying on these investments to supplement their income. Mayfield
14 overstated the net worth of the couple on the subscription agreement by at least \$140,000, falsely
15 representing that the investments met the MIS guidelines. Excluding their residence, over one-half of
16 their net worth was invested in the proprietary products.

17 59. In April 2002, Mayfield sold a \$5,000 Metropolitan debenture to a retired couple in their
18 late 70s. Including this investment, the couple had approximately \$127,000 invested in the proprietary
19 products. Their primary investment objective was preservation of capital. They were seeking a low risk
20 and secure investment to supplement their income. At the time of this investment, the couple had close
21 to one-quarter of their net worth invested in the proprietary products.

1 60. In September 2002, Mayfield sold a \$12,000 Metropolitan debenture to an 85 year-old
2 widow who was living in a retirement home. Including this investment, she had approximately \$30,000
3 invested in Metropolitan debentures. Her primary investment objective was preservation of capital and
4 she did not want to put her investments at risk. Her previous investment experience was limited to
5 certificates of deposit. Social Security payments were her primary source of income. Her only other
6 asset consisted of the proceeds of the recent sale of her home. Over one-quarter of her net worth was
7 invested in the Metropolitan debentures.

8 *Fraudulent Presentations*

9 61. Mayfield made statements to investors regarding the proprietary products that were
10 inconsistent with the risks of the investments, including the risk that investors could lose some or all of
11 their principal (see above, "Risks of the Proprietary Products"). Mayfield emphasized only the safety
12 and soundness of the investments during his presentations to investors. These presentations focused on
13 apparently positive attributes of the proprietary products, including one or more of the following:
14 Metropolitan and Summit having never missed a payment to investors; the length of time Metropolitan
15 had been in business and the company's reputation in the Spokane community; the large asset base of
16 Metropolitan, Summit and their subsidiaries; the companies' extensive real estate holdings; the high
17 interest rates of the proprietary products; and that he was personally invested in the proprietary products.
18 By virtue of these presentations, investments that had significant risk were offered and sold by Mayfield
19 as virtually risk-free.

1 Theodore R. Metoyer

2 *Background*

3 62. Theodore R. Metoyer (“Metoyer”) associated with MIS in November 1984. Prior to his
4 association with MIS, Metoyer had no experience selling securities. Metoyer’s prior work experience
5 included being a home delivery manager for a Spokane publishing company and a circulation manager
6 for a publishing company in California.

7 63. Metoyer worked part-time at MIS from 1984 until approximately June 2000. During that
8 time period, Metoyer had a few hundred clients. Metoyer began to work full-time as a MIS
9 representative in June 2000. At that time, he purchased a book of business of approximately 800 clients
10 from a representative who was retiring. He also purchased a book of business of approximately 400
11 clients from another representative who retired in 2002. Metoyer did business from Metropolitan’s
12 headquarters in Spokane, Washington.

13 64. From January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003, Metoyer made approximately 2,624
14 sales of the proprietary products. These sales totaled approximately \$35,800,000. According to
15 Metoyer, almost 40% of his sales during the relevant time period were made to investors who had 20% or
16 more of their net worth concentrated in the proprietary products.

17 *Unsuitable Investment Recommendations and Falsifying of Account Information*

18 65. Metoyer made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to many investors.
19 These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and had a limited
20 knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other assets, and who
21 were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their retirement
22 years, as illustrated by the three examples below.

1 66. In June 2002, Metoyer sold Metropolitan preferred stock worth over \$38,000 to a couple
2 who were 68 and 58 years of age. Including this investment, they had approximately \$54,000 invested in
3 Metropolitan preferred stock. The couple wanted a safe investment and did not want to lose any of their
4 principal. They were seeking a liquid investment that was not subject to market volatility. Metoyer
5 overstated the couple's net worth on the subscription agreement by quadrupling its value, falsely
6 representing that the investments met the MIS guidelines. At the time of this investment, virtually their
7 entire net worth, excluding their residence, was invested in Metropolitan preferred stock.

8 67. In March 2003, Metoyer sold three Metropolitan debentures totaling approximately \$36,000
9 to a woman in her late fifties. Including this investment, she had approximately \$60,000 invested in the
10 proprietary products. Her investment objective was to save for retirement. She was seeking a safe
11 investment that would avoid exposure to stock market volatility. At the time of this investment, almost
12 two-thirds of her net worth was invested in the proprietary products.

13 68. In August 2002, Metoyer sold three Summit investment certificates totaling \$30,000 to an
14 87 year-old widow. Including these investments, she had approximately \$69,000 in Summit investment
15 certificates. She relied on the monthly interest from these investments to pay her living expenses. Her
16 only other source of income was a small Social Security payment. Metoyer overstated her net worth on
17 the subscription agreements by tripling its value, falsely representing that the investments met the MIS
18 guidelines. Virtually her entire net worth, excluding her residence, was invested in the Summit
19 investment certificates. Due to the bankruptcy of Summit, her only remaining asset is her home and she
20 is reliant on Social Security payments totaling approximately \$5,000 per year to pay her living expenses.

21 69. In January 2003, Metoyer sold two Metropolitan debentures totaling \$16,000 to an 80 year-
22 old widow living in low-income government-subsidized housing. Her primary investment objective was

1 preservation of capital. She was seeking to supplement her modest Social Security payments, which was
2 her only other source of income. Metoyer overstated her net worth on the subscription agreement by
3 more than doubling its value, falsely representing that the investments met the MIS guidelines. At the
4 time of this investment, over one-half of her net worth of \$30,000 was invested in Metropolitan
5 debentures.

6 *Fraudulent Presentations*

7 70. Metoyer made statements to investors regarding the proprietary products that were
8 inconsistent with the risks of the investments, including the risk that investors could lose some or all of
9 their principal (see above, "Risks of the Proprietary Products"). Metoyer emphasized only the safety and
10 soundness of the investments during his presentations to investors. These presentations focused on
11 apparently positive attributes of the proprietary products, including one or more of the following:
12 Metropolitan and Summit having never missed a payment to investors; the length of time Metropolitan
13 had been in business and the company's reputation in the Spokane community; the large asset base of
14 Metropolitan, Summit and their subsidiaries; the companies' extensive real estate holdings; the high
15 interest rates of the proprietary products; and that he was personally invested in the proprietary products.
16 By virtue of these presentations, investments that had significant risk were offered and sold by Metoyer
17 as virtually risk-free.

18 Randal M. Saccomanno

19 *Background*

20 71. Randal M. Saccomanno ("Randal") associated with MIS in June 1994. Prior to his
21 association with MIS, Randal had no experience selling securities. Randal's prior work experience was
22 as a warehouse manager for a grocery wholesaler and as a cook.

1 72. Randal did business from Metropolitan's headquarters in Spokane, Washington.

2 73. Despite the ability to offer a wide range of investments, Randal sold the proprietary
3 products almost exclusively. As of August 2002, proprietary products accounted for approximately 95%
4 of his total MIS income.

5 74. From January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003, Randal made approximately 1,179 sales
6 of the proprietary products. These sales totaled approximately \$10,792,600. According to Randal,
7 almost one-fifth of his sales during the relevant time period were made to investors who had 20% or
8 more of their net worth concentrated in the proprietary products.

9 *Unsuitable Investment Recommendations and Falsifying of Account Information*

10 75. Randal made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to many investors.
11 These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and had a limited
12 knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other assets, and who
13 were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their retirement
14 years, as illustrated by the three examples below.

15 76. In April 2003, Randal recommended and sold two Metropolitan debentures totaling
16 \$52,000 to an 83 year-old widow. She wanted a stable and secure investment that would supplement her
17 social security income. Prior to these investments, the customer had approximately \$140,000 invested in
18 the proprietary products. Including the 2003 investment, the customer had almost 50% of her net worth
19 invested in Metropolitan and Summit.

20 77. In April 2002, Randal sold two Metropolitan debentures totaling approximately \$35,000 to
21 a 71 year-old retired woman who was living on a fixed income of approximately \$23,000 per year.
22 Including these investments, she had over \$100,000 invested in Metropolitan debentures. Her primary

1 investment objective was preservation of capital. On her subscription agreement, Randal overstated her
2 net worth by at least \$65,000, falsely representing that the investments met the MIS guidelines. As of
3 April 2002, her Metropolitan investments represented almost one-third of her net worth.

4 78. In December 2002, Randal sold a five-year Summit investment certificate in the amount of
5 \$20,000 to an 81 year-old widow. She was living on a fixed income of approximately \$15,000 per year
6 and had a low risk tolerance. After having experienced losses in a mutual fund, she was seeking a safe
7 investment that would help supplement her limited income while protecting the value of her principal.
8 Based on what Randal told her, she believed that a Summit investment certificate was the lowest risk
9 investment that he could offer her. Her only liquid asset was a small savings account. Randal overstated
10 her net worth on the subscription agreement, falsely representing that the investments met the MIS
11 guidelines. In actuality, the Summit investment represented approximately 40% of her net worth.

12 *Fraudulent Presentations*

13 79. Randal made statements to investors regarding the proprietary products that were
14 inconsistent with the risks of the investments, including the risk that investors could lose some or all of
15 their principal (see above, "Risks of the Proprietary Products"). Randal emphasized only the safety and
16 soundness of the investments during his presentations to investors. These presentations focused on
17 apparently positive attributes of the proprietary products, including one or more of the following:
18 Metropolitan and Summit having never missed a payment to investors; the length of time Metropolitan
19 had been in business and the company's reputation in the Spokane community; the large asset base of
20 Metropolitan, Summit and their subsidiaries; the companies' extensive real estate holdings; the high
21 interest rates of the proprietary products; and that he and his family were personally invested in the
22

1 proprietary products. By virtue of these presentations, investments that had significant risk were offered
2 and sold by Randal as virtually risk-free.

3 Ronald J. Saccomanno

4 *Background*

5 80. Ronald J. Saccomanno (“Ronald”) associated with MIS in February 1998. Prior to his
6 association with MIS, Ronald had no experience selling securities. Ronald’s prior work experience was
7 in the grocery industry as a warehouse manager and owning a restaurant.

8 81. Ronald did business from Metropolitan’s headquarters in Spokane, Washington.

9 82. Despite the ability to offer a wide range of investments, Ronald sold the proprietary
10 products almost exclusively. As of August 2002, proprietary products accounted for approximately 99%
11 of his total MIS income.

12 83. From January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003, Ronald made approximately 854 sales
13 of the proprietary products. These sales totaled approximately \$13,137,300. According to Ronald,
14 almost one-quarter of his sales during the relevant time period were made to investors who had 20% or
15 more of their net worth concentrated in the proprietary products.

16 *Unsuitable Investment Recommendations and Falsifying of Account Information*

17 84. Ronald made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to many investors.
18 These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and had a limited
19 knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other assets, and who
20 were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their retirement
21 years, as illustrated by the three examples below.

1 85. In August 2001, Ronald began to aggressively market Metropolitan investments to
2 employees of Rosauers grocery stores. Due a change in ownership of Rosauers, employees were
3 receiving cash distributions from their employee stock ownership plans (“ESOPs”) that they needed to
4 invest in qualified retirement plans. Ronald attended a seminar that was put on by D.A. Davidson for
5 Rosauers employees and distributed his business card. Ronald was not invited to this event by Rosauers
6 and was present without the approval of Rosauers. He also went to Rosauers stores and sat in the break
7 room to meet employees. Ronald attracted several Rosauers employees as clients. The Rosauers clients
8 had limited investment experience and their ESOPs comprised the bulk of their assets. Many of these
9 investors were seeking safety of their principal and wanted a low risk investment. Ronald recommended
10 that many of these clients invest their entire ESOP into Metropolitan debentures. For example, Ronald
11 sold two Metropolitan debentures totaling \$87,000 to a Rosauers meat cutter. Ronald overstated the
12 customer’s net worth by over \$100,000, falsely representing that the investments met the MIS guidelines.
13 In actuality, the Metropolitan debentures represented approximately 40% of his net worth.

14 86. In June 2000, Ronald sold a \$40,000 Metropolitan debenture to a 70 year-old retired man
15 whose wife was incapacitated due to a stroke.² One year later, Ronald sold the man another debenture in
16 the amount of approximately \$43,000. Both debentures were for a term of five years. The investor’s
17 primary investment objective was preservation of capital. At the time of the second sale, he had
18 approximately 35% of his net worth invested in Metropolitan.

19 87. In June 2002, Ronald sold a \$5,000 Metropolitan debenture and a \$15,000 Summit
20 investment certificate to a 59 year-old unemployed disabled woman. She had a low risk tolerance and
21

22
23 ² His wife subsequently died.

1 her investment objective was preservation of capital. She had no previous investment experience. The
2 woman had recently inherited \$75,000 from a relative and was relying on it to pay future living expenses.
3 She had no other assets and her only source of income was a payment of \$460 per month from the
4 Veterans Administration. Ronald also sold this woman a \$30,000 WULA fixed annuity. Her
5 Metropolitan and Summit investments represented 27% of her net worth.

6 *Fraudulent Presentations*

7 88. Ronald made statements to investors regarding the proprietary products that were
8 inconsistent with the risks of the investments, including the risk that investors could lose some or all of
9 their principal (see above, "Risks of the Proprietary Products"). Ronald emphasized only the safety and
10 soundness of the investments during his presentations to investors. These presentations focused on
11 apparently positive attributes of the proprietary products, including one or more of the following:
12 Metropolitan and Summit having never missed a payment to investors; the length of time Metropolitan
13 had been in business and the company's reputation in the Spokane community; the large asset base of
14 Metropolitan, Summit and their subsidiaries; the companies' extensive real estate holdings; the high
15 interest rates of the proprietary products; and that he and his family were personally invested in the
16 proprietary products. By virtue of these presentations, investments that had significant risk were offered
17 and sold by Ronald as virtually risk-free.

18 Ryan S. Saccomanno

19 *Background*

20 89. Ryan S. Saccomanno ("Ryan") associated with MIS in November 1989. Prior to his
21 association with MIS, Ryan had no experience selling securities. Ryan's prior work experience consisted
22 of ten years with Safeway Stores Inc. in various positions, including cashier and produce clerk.

1 90. Ryan did business from Metropolitan's headquarters in Spokane, Washington.

2 91. Upon joining MIS as an independent contractor, Ryan offered only Metropolitan
3 debentures. After MIS became a full-service brokerage in the mid-1990s, Ryan continued to sell the
4 proprietary products almost exclusively. As of August 2002, proprietary products accounted for
5 approximately 90-95% of his total MIS income.

6 92. From January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003, Ryan made approximately 1,305 sales
7 of the proprietary products. These sales totaled approximately \$15,164,386. According to Ryan, almost
8 one-half of his sales during the relevant time period were made to investors who had 20% or more of
9 their net worth concentrated in the proprietary products.

10 *Unsuitable Investment Recommendations and Falsifying of Account Information*

11 93. Ryan made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to many investors.
12 These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and had a limited
13 knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other assets, and who
14 were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their retirement
15 years, as illustrated by the three examples below.

16 94. In July 2001, Ryan sold a Metropolitan debenture worth approximately \$4,750 to a couple
17 in their mid-50s. Including this investment, the couple had approximately \$30,000 invested in
18 Metropolitan. Their investment objective was to provide for retirement and they were seeking an
19 investment that provided safety and capital preservation. The wife was unable to work due to health
20 problems. Their other assets included a retirement account and certificates of deposit. Including the
21 2003 investment, the customers had approximately 30% of their net worth invested in Metropolitan.

1 95. In 2001 and 2002, Ryan sold six investments in Metropolitan debentures and Summit
2 investment certificates totaling approximately \$95,470 to a retired couple in their early 70s who were
3 living on a fixed income. The customers wanted low risk, secure investments to supplement their Social
4 Security payments. Ryan overstated their net worth by doubling its value, falsely representing that the
5 investments met the MIS guidelines. In actuality, these investments represented approximately two-
6 thirds of their net worth, excluding their home.

7 96. In October 2002, Ryan sold two Metropolitan debentures worth approximately \$43,500 to
8 an 85 year-old widow living on a fixed income of \$7,000 per year. One debenture, approximately half of
9 her investment, was for a term of two years and the other was for a term of five years. The customer was
10 seeking a low risk investment that would provide safety of principal. She had previously been invested
11 in a mutual fund and wanted an investment that was not subject to market volatility. She did not own a
12 home. Her Metropolitan investments represented almost 30% of her net worth.

13 *Fraudulent Presentations*

14 97. Ryan made statements to investors regarding the proprietary products that were inconsistent
15 with the risks of the investments, including the risk that investors could lose some or all of their principal
16 (see above, "Risks of the Proprietary Products"). Ryan emphasized only the safety and soundness of the
17 investments during his presentations to investors. These presentations focused on apparently positive
18 attributes of the proprietary products, including one or more of the following: Metropolitan and Summit
19 having never missed a payment to investors; the length of time Metropolitan had been in business and the
20 company's reputation in the Spokane community; the large asset base of Metropolitan, Summit and their
21 subsidiaries; the companies' extensive real estate holdings; the high interest rates of the proprietary
22 products; and that he and his family were personally invested in the proprietary products. By virtue of

1 these presentations, investments that had significant risk were offered and sold by Ryan as virtually risk-
2 free.

3 Elizabeth Adams Armstrong

4 98. Elizabeth Adams Armstrong (“Armstrong”) associated with MIS in September 1995. Prior
5 to her association with MIS, Armstrong had no experience selling securities.

6 99. Armstrong is the daughter of Gordon and Suzanne Adams. After joining MIS, Armstrong
7 began to take over various accounts from her parents and shared in the commissions of the accounts of
8 her parents. Many of the accounts she took over were those of customers who lived in Western
9 Washington. While associated with MIS, Armstrong did business from her home in Beaverton, Oregon.

10 100. Upon joining MIS as an independent contractor, Armstrong offered the proprietary products
11 almost exclusively. As of January 2003, proprietary products accounted for over 90% of her total MIS
12 income. According to Armstrong, during the relevant time period, she made approximately 142 sales of
13 the proprietary products totaling over \$2,100,000 to investors who had over 20% of their net worth
14 concentrated in the proprietary products.

15 101. Armstrong made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to one or more
16 investors. These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and
17 had a limited knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other
18 assets, and who were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their
19 retirement years, as illustrated by the example below.

20 102. In November 2002, Armstrong sold a Metropolitan debenture worth approximately \$75,000
21 to a retired couple in their late 60s. Including this investment, the couple had approximately \$170,000
22 invested in the proprietary products. The couple had an investment objective of preservation of capital

1 and had a low risk tolerance. Their investments in the proprietary products comprised over 40% of their
2 net worth.

3 Gary T. Hundebly

4 103. Gary T. Hundebly (“Hundebly”) associated with MIS in September 1984. Prior to his
5 association with MIS, Hundebly had no experience selling securities.

6 104. Hundebly did business from his home in University Place, Washington.

7 105. Upon joining MIS as an independent contractor, Hundebly offered only Metropolitan
8 debentures. After MIS became a full-service brokerage in the mid-1990s, Hundebly continued to sell
9 primarily the proprietary products. According to Hundebly, during the relevant time period, he made
10 approximately 227 sales of the proprietary products totaling over \$2,300,000 to investors who had over
11 20% of their net worth concentrated in the proprietary products.

12 106. Hundebly made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to one or more
13 investors. These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and
14 had a limited knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other
15 assets, and who were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their
16 retirement years, as illustrated by the example below.

17 107. In January 2003, Hundebly sold a \$15,000 Summit investment certificate to a 69 year-old
18 retired woman. Including these investments, she had approximately \$150,000 invested in the proprietary
19 products. She had an investment objective of preservation of capital. Her investments in the proprietary
20 products comprised over 40% of her net worth.

1 Lori L. Masterson

2 108. Lori L. Masterson (“Masterson”) associated with MIS in approximately March 1987. Prior
3 to her association with MIS, Masterson had no experience selling securities.

4 109. Masterson did business from Metropolitan’s headquarters in Spokane, Washington.

5 110. Masterson primarily sold the proprietary products during her association with MIS.
6 According to Masterson, during the relevant time period, she made approximately 125 sales of the
7 proprietary products totaling almost \$1,000,000 to investors who had over 20% of their net worth
8 concentrated in the proprietary products.

9 111. Masterson made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to one or more
10 investors. These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and
11 had a limited knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other
12 assets, and who were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their
13 retirement years, as illustrated by the example below.

14 112. In January 2001, Masterson sold a \$40,000 Summit investment certificate to a 70 year-old
15 widow. She had a low risk tolerance and her investment objective was preservation of capital. She
16 wanted to use her Summit investment to supplement her Social Security payments upon retiring. Her
17 investment in Summit comprised almost 30% of her net worth.

18 Michael H. McMillen

19 113. Michael H. McMillen (“McMillen”) associated with MIS in May 1997. Prior to his
20 association with MIS, McMillen had no experience selling securities.

21 114. When McMillen began to sell securities for MIS, he purchased a book of business from two
22 Vancouver, Washington representatives who were retiring. This book of business included MIS clients

1 who were located mostly in the White Salmon, Washington area. McMillen did business from his home
2 in White Salmon.

3 115. McMillen primarily sold the proprietary products during his association with MIS.
4 According to McMillen, during the relevant time period, he made approximately 223 sales of the
5 proprietary products totaling almost \$3,300,000 to investors who had over 20% of their net worth
6 concentrated in the proprietary products.

7 116. McMillen made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to one or more
8 investors. These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and
9 had a limited knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other
10 assets, and who were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their
11 retirement years, as illustrated by the example below.

12 117. In February 2003, McMillen sold a \$15,000 Metropolitan debenture and Metropolitan
13 preferred stock worth \$10,000 to a 76 year-old woman. Including these investments, she had
14 approximately \$50,000 invested in the proprietary products. She had a low risk tolerance and was
15 seeking an investment that would supplement her retirement. McMillen overstated her net worth on her
16 subscription agreement by approximately \$100,000, falsely representing that the investments met the
17 MIS guidelines. As of February 2003, her Metropolitan and Summit investments represented
18 approximately one-half of her net worth.

19 Lamar J. Miller and Annette O. Miller

20 118. Lamar J. Miller associated with MIS in January 1979 and his wife, Annette O. Miller,
21 associated with MIS in March 1985 (collectively “the Millers”). Prior to their association with MIS, the
22 Millers had no experience selling securities.

1 119. During the relevant time period, the Millers did business from an office in Spokane,
2 Washington.

3 120. Upon joining MIS as independent contractors, the Millers offered only Metropolitan
4 debentures. After MIS became a full-service brokerage in the mid-1990s, the Millers continued to sell
5 primarily the proprietary products. According to the Millers, during the relevant time period, they made
6 approximately 517 sales of the proprietary products totaling over \$10,400,000 to investors who had over
7 20% of their net worth concentrated in the proprietary products.

8 121. The Millers made unsuitable recommendations of the proprietary products to one or more
9 investors. These investors were retired, living on a fixed income, seeking safety of their principal, and
10 had a limited knowledge of investing. They were people of modest means, who had few or no other
11 assets, and who were dependent upon their Metropolitan and Summit investments to sustain them in their
12 retirement years, as illustrated by the example below.

13 122. In December 2001, the Millers sold a Metropolitan debenture totaling approximately
14 \$15,000 to a couple in their 60s. The husband had been retired for several years and was receiving
15 disability payments. Their primary investment objective was preservation of capital. They were seeking
16 a low risk investment and they were relying on their investment to fund their retirement. This investment
17 represented approximately one-third of their net worth. The couple's remaining assets, excluding their
18 home, totaled \$35,000.

19 Based upon the above Tentative Findings of Fact, the following Conclusions of Law are made:

20 **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

21 1. The offer or sale of debentures, investment certificates, notes, and/or preferred stock
22 constitutes the offer and sale of securities as defined by RCW 21.20.005(10) and (12).

1 2. Gordon E. Adams, Suzanne T. Adams, Elizabeth Adams Armstrong, Ross E. Bruner, Steve
2 F. Haug, Gary T. Hundebly, Lori L. Masterson, Ronald H. Mayfield, Michael H. McMillen, Theodore R.
3 Metoyer, Lamar J. Miller, Annette O. Miller, Randal M. Saccomanno, Ronald J. Saccomanno, and Ryan
4 S. Saccomanno, as described above, recommended the purchase of securities to customers without
5 reasonable grounds to believe that the transactions were suitable for such customers, in violation of RCW
6 21.20.702. Such practice is grounds for the revocation or suspension of their securities salesperson and/or
7 investment adviser representative registrations, the imposition of a fine, and/or a censure, pursuant to
8 RCW 21.20.110(1).

9 3. Gordon E. Adams, Suzanne T. Adams, Ross E. Bruner, Steve F. Haug, Ronald H. Mayfield,
10 Theodore R. Metoyer, Randal M. Saccomanno, Ronald J. Saccomanno, and Ryan S. Saccomanno, as
11 described above, in connection with the offer and sale of securities, made untrue statements of material
12 fact or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
13 circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, and/or engaged in an act, practice, or course
14 of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon investors, in violation of RCW
15 21.20.010. Such practice is grounds for the revocation or suspension of their securities salesperson
16 registration and/or investment adviser representative registrations and for the imposition of a fine
17 pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(1).

18 4. Gordon E. Adams, Suzanne T. Adams, Ross E. Bruner, Steve F. Haug, Ronald H. Mayfield,
19 Theodore R. Metoyer, Randal M. Saccomanno, Ronald J. Saccomanno, and Ryan S. Saccomanno, as
20 described above, engaged in one or more dishonest or unethical sales practices in the securities business,
21 as defined by WAC 460-22B-090(3), by establishing or maintaining accounts containing fictitious
22 information in order to execute transactions which would otherwise be prohibited. Such practice is

1 grounds for the revocation or suspension of their securities salesperson and/or investment adviser
2 representative registrations and for the imposition of a fine pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(1).

3 **NOTICE OF INTENT TO ORDER RESPONDENTS TO CEASE AND DESIST**

4 Pursuant to RCW 21.20.390, and based upon the above Tentative Findings of Fact and
5 Conclusions of Law, the Securities Administrator intends to order that Respondents Gordon E. Adams,
6 Suzanne T. Adams, Ross E. Bruner, Steve F. Haug, Ronald H. Mayfield, Theodore R. Metoyer, Randal
7 M. Saccomanno, Ronald J. Saccomanno, and Ryan S. Saccomanno permanently cease and desist from
8 violations of RCW 21.20.010.

9 **NOTICE OF INTENT TO REVOKE OR SUSPEND REGISTRATION**

10 Pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(1), and based upon the above Tentative Findings of Fact and
11 Conclusions of Law, the Securities Administrator intends to order that the salesperson and/or investment
12 adviser representative registrations of Respondents Gordon E. Adams, Suzanne T. Adams, Ross E.
13 Bruner, Steve F. Haug, Ronald H. Mayfield, Theodore R. Metoyer, Randal M. Saccomanno, Ronald J.
14 Saccomanno, and Ryan S. Saccomanno be revoked or suspended.

15 **NOTICE OF INTENT TO CENSURE**

16 Pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(1), and based upon the above Tentative Findings of Fact and
17 Conclusions of Law, the Securities Administrator intends to order that Respondents Elizabeth Adams
18 Armstrong, Gary T. Hundebly, Lori L. Masterson, Michael H. McMillen, Lamar J. Miller, and Annette O.
19 Miller be censured.

20 **NOTICE OF INTENT TO IMPOSE FINES**

21 Pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(1) and (4) and/or RCW 21.20.395, and based upon the above
22 Tentative Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Securities Administrator intends to order that:

- 1 a. Respondents Gordon E. Adams and Suzanne T. Adams shall be jointly and severally liable for
2 and pay a fine of \$30,000;
- 3 b. Respondent Elizabeth Adams Armstrong shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$10,000.
- 4 c. Respondent Ross E. Bruner shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$30,000;
- 5 d. Respondent Steve F. Haug shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$30,000;
- 6 e. Respondent Gary T. Hundebly shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$10,000;
- 7 f. Respondent Lori L. Masterson shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$10,000;
- 8 g. Respondent Ronald H. Mayfield shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$30,000;
- 9 h. Respondent Michael H. McMillen shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$10,000;
- 10 i. Respondent Theodore R. Metoyer shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$30,000;
- 11 j. Respondents Lamar J. Miller and Annette O. Miller shall be jointly and severally liable for
12 and pay a fine of \$10,000;
- 13 k. Respondent Randal M. Saccomanno shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$30,000;
- 14 l. Respondent Ronald J. Saccomanno shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$30,000; and
- 15 m. Respondent Ryan S. Saccomanno shall be liable for and pay a fine of \$30,000.

16 **NOTICE OF INTENT TO CHARGE COSTS**

17 Pursuant to RCW 21.20.110(7) and/or RCW 21.20.390(5), based upon the above Tentative
18 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Securities Administrator intends to order that Respondents
19 Gordon E. Adams, Suzanne T. Adams, Elizabeth Adams Armstrong, Ross E. Bruner, Steve F. Haug,
20 Gary T. Hundebly, Lori L. Masterson, Ronald H. Mayfield, Michael H. McMillen, Theodore R. Metoyer,
21 Lamar J. Miller, Annette O. Miller, Randal M. Saccomanno, Ronald J. Saccomanno, and Ryan S.

1 Saccomanno shall be liable for and pay the costs, fees and other expenses incurred in the conduct of the
2 administrative investigation and hearing of this matter.

3 **AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURE**

4 This Order is entered pursuant to the provisions of RCW 21.20.110, RCW 21.20.390, and RCW
5 21.20.395, and is subject to the provisions of RCW 21.20.120 and Chapter 34.05 RCW. The Respondents
6 may make a written request for a hearing as set forth in the NOTICE OF OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND
7 AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING accompanying this Order. If a Respondent does not request a
8 hearing, the Securities Administrator intends to adopt the foregoing Tentative Findings of Fact and
9 Conclusions of Law as final, and enter a permanent order against that Respondent revoking or
10 suspending that Respondent's securities salesperson and/or investment adviser representative registration,
11 imposing a fine, a censure, and/or charging costs, as described above with regard to that Respondent.

12 **CONTINUING INVESTIGATION**

13 The Securities Division is continuing to investigate this matter, including the practices of the
14 Respondents, to determine the full extent of the violations of the Securities Act that may have occurred.

15 DATED AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2004.

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18 MICHAEL E. STEVENSON
19 Securities Administrator

20 Approved by:

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22 Martin Cordell
23 Chief of Enforcement

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Presented by:



Andrea Y. Sato
Enforcement Attorney



Chad C. Standifer
Enforcement Attorney